Saturday, February 13, 2010

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY:

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY:
...

Tocqueville, in a similar vein, argued that the distinctive character of the American political system was the high degree of material equality found in America. In comparison to aristocratic Europe, Tocqueville was clearly correct, but in fact there was a great deal of inequality in early America, indeed only slightly less than there is now. For example, the bottom seven deciles in 1776 owned a mere fifteen percent of all wealth and in 1973 the bottom seven deciles also owned fifteen percent of all wealth. In the past two hundred years, what has changed is that wealth has become more highly concentrated in the upper reaches. In 1774, the top 1% owned 15 percent of all wealth, but by 1973 the top one percent of families owned 32.6 percent of all wealth, and by 1989 the top one percent owned nearly 40% of all wealth (NYT 4/17/95). Thus, the rich truly did get richer. Over the same period, the gini coefficient increased from .73 in 1774 to .81 in 1973. (Osberg, p. 44.) Since 1983 the distribution of wealth has become even more uneven. The top one percent's share went from 32.6 percent in 1973 to 37 percent in 1989. (Osberg on earlier data, Peterson on later data.) As the graph below shows, in the 1990's the share of wealth owned by the top one percent exceeded 40 percent.

Source: http://epn.org/prospect/22/22wolf.html

The significance of this data is that a basic presumption of virtually all versions of democracy is that there is a direct relationship between the distribution of wealth and income on the one hand, and the possibility of democracy on the other. Extreme economic inequalities lead inexorably to inequalities of power. What is at stake, then, is the possibility of democracy. Since wealth can be translated into political power, extreme inequalities in the distribution of wealth tend to produce extreme inequalities in political power. Indeed, virtually every study of political participation, which is, of course, relevant to the exercise of political power, have found a direct relationship between SES and political activity (explain). Likewise, in each succeeding edition of Dye's book, the concentration of wealth and income has increased, and the number of individuals who control more than half the nation's power has decreased. But the reverse is also true. Extreme inequalities of political power lead to extreme economic inequalities. As Wallace Peterson has noted: "Control of the central government is the key to having a major voice in determining the distribution of income and wealth." (p.95) ...

Crime and Punishment: Some Costs of Inequality - Economix Blog - NYTimes.com

Crime and Punishment: Some Costs of Inequality - Economix Blog - NYTimes.com

Nancy Folbre is a professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.

Once upon a time, economists told us that efforts to reduce income inequality would be punished by lower economic growth. The title of a famous book published by Arthur Okun in 1975 tells the story — “Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff.”

...

Economists across the political spectrum have turned the logic of laissez-faire around, emphasizing that rational economic agents are easily tempted to misbehave. Jack Hirshleifer, a highly respected mainstream economist, has called attention to “the dark side of the force” — crime, war and politics. Why participate in the market if you can do better by engaging in theft or fraud?

To paraphrase Bob Dylan, if you ain’t got much, you ain’t got much to lose. On the other hand, the more you got, the more you got to protect. Richard Wilkinson’s new book, “The Impact of Inequality,” summarizes evidence from comparative studies that violence is greater — and trust and cooperation lower — in more unequal societies. (He also argues that inequality is bad for health, a topic I’ll return to in a future post.)

Both crime and incarceration go up along with inequality. In the United States, we incarcerate a higher percentage of our population than any other country in the world. The sociologist Bruce Western and others argue that reduced economic opportunities for young black men help explain increases in our incarceration rates over the past 20 years.

The average cost of maintaining a prisoner in a federal facility, estimated at over $23,876 in 2005, was higher than the average cost of attending a private college or university in that year.

In an article titled “Garrison America,” the economists Samuel Bowles and Arjun Jayadev argue that “guard labor” (defined broadly to include all those who protect property or impose discipline on others) diverts resources from more productive uses. In more egalitarian countries like Sweden, less guard labor is required.

Even small differences in inequality have a discernible effect. For instance, the percentage of total employment represented by private detectives, investigators and security guards goes up in major cities along with household income inequality as measured by a Gini coefficient (see chart). More than 1.2 percent of all employees in New York, Los Angeles and Miami — all relatively unequal cities — worked as private guards in 2000, compared to 0.6 percent in more egalitarian Minneapolis.

INSERT DESCRIPTION
...

Santa Fe Institute economist: one in four Americans is employed to guard the wealth of the rich Boing Boing

Santa Fe Institute economist: one in four Americans is employed to guard the wealth of the rich Boing Boing

By Cory Doctorow at 10:45 PM February 5, 2010

Here's a fascinating profile on radical Santa Fe Institute economist Samuel Bowles, an empiricist who says his research doesn't support the Chicago School efficient marketplace hypothesis. Instead, Bowles argues that the wealth inequality created by strict market economics creates inefficiencies because society has to devote so much effort to stopping the poor from expropriating the rich. He calls this "guard labor" and says that one in four Americans is employed to in the sector -- labor that could otherwise be used to increase the nation's wealth and progress.


The greater the inequalities in a society, the more guard labor it requires, Bowles finds. This holds true among US states, with relatively unequal states like New Mexico employing a greater share of guard labor than relatively egalitarian states like Wisconsin.

The problem, Bowles argues, is that too much guard labor sustains "illegitimate inequalities," creating a drag on the economy. All of the people in guard labor jobs could be doing something more productive with their time--perhaps starting their own businesses or helping to reduce the US trade deficit with China.

Guard labor supports what one might call the beat-down economy. Community Action's Porter sees it all the time.

"We have based almost everything we have done on the idea that we always need a part of our workforce that is marginalized--that we can call this group into action at any time, pay them nothing and they will do anything that needs to be done," she says.

More discouraging, perhaps, is the statistical fact that a person born into this workforce has little chance of rising beyond it.

/////////////////////////////

The ever-expanding copyright laws(both the passing, and the expense of enforcing) are a good example of this.

...

I guess this is an example of Karl Marx' observation in the 19th century: "relations of production lag behind the productive forces and become fetters on the growth of society's productivity" -- A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859)

...

Did anyone see QI in Britain yesterday evening? They were quoting some amazing statistics about the US prison population -

America has 5% of the Earths population but about 25% of the Earths prison population, many of whom work as forced labor.

US prisoners make almost all helmets for the military, 42% of bullet proof vests, 60% of license plates, etc.

The 'three strikes' rule was highlighted for putting some people away for 25 years to life for trivial offenses such as stealing videos, cookies, etc.

They were claiming that in some parts of America there are more 19 year old black males in prison than in college, and implying that America has basically re-invented slavery.

It's a weird world we live in.

...

Regarding your stats, it was actually 100% of all military helmets, ammunition belts, bulletproof vests, ID tags, and other items of uniform, are made by prisoner labour.

Also made in the US by forced prison labour, for 25¢ an hour (meaning a competitive edge against Mexico and China):

93% of domestically produced paint.

36% of home appliances.

21% of office furniture.

And remember 1 in 30 men, aged 20-34 is in jail. For black men the figure is 1 in 9.

"They were claiming that in some parts of America there are more 19 year old black males in prison than in college.."

Actually, the stat wasn't restricted to an area, in the US there are more 17 year old black men in jail than in college.

...

Yes, yes let us subject the airy fairy academic theories of uncle miltie friedmann and the U. of Chicago gang to rigorous test. Oh wait, we just did. They failed, causing potentially the biggest bank bust in history. Let's see now how about that rigorous old alan greenspan. He based his ideas on, wait for it, a romance novelist named ayn rand. Man that's great academic rigor. We need more of that kind of clear headed thought. Then there is ben bernanke, reknowned academic expert on the Great epression. He must have seen the bank failures coming. Anything that radical must have shown some signs to such an expert, right? Nope, guess not.

Now what was your problem with this Bowles guy? Lack of rigor, yeah that was it. How about class warfare, that sounds more like it. Any nonsense that favors the upper class is declared rigorous, clear and well thought out. Any minor protection for working people is just terribly impractical. Now why don't you just say it and quit trying to put out this smokescreen about scholarly test?

...


Op-Ed Contributor - Microsoft’s Creative Destruction - NYTimes.com

Op-Ed Contributor - Microsoft’s Creative Destruction - NYTimes.com

[a metaphor for the US? ....ed.]

AS they marvel at Apple’s new iPad tablet computer, the technorati seem to be focusing on where this leaves Amazon’s popular e-book business. But the much more important question is why Microsoft, America’s most famous and prosperous technology company, no longer brings us the future, whether it’s tablet computers like the iPad, e-books like Amazon’s Kindle, smartphones like the BlackBerry and iPhone, search engines like Google, digital music systems like iPod and iTunes or popular Web services like Facebook and Twitter.

Some people take joy in Microsoft’s struggles, as the popular view in recent years paints the company as an unrepentant intentional monopolist. Good riddance if it fails. But those of us who worked there know it differently. At worst, you can say it’s a highly repentant, largely accidental monopolist. It employs thousands of the smartest, most capable engineers in the world. More than any other firm, it made using computers both ubiquitous and affordable. Microsoft’s Windows operating system and Office applications suite still utterly rule their markets.

The company’s chief executive, Steve Ballmer, has continued to deliver huge profits. They totaled well over $100 billion in the past 10 years alone and help sustain the economies of Seattle, Washington State and the nation as a whole. Its founder, Bill Gates, is not only the most generous philanthropist in history, but has also inspired thousands of his employees to give generously themselves. No one in his right mind should wish Microsoft failure.

And yet it is failing, even as it reports record earnings. As the fellow who tried (and largely failed) to make tablet PCs and e-books happen at Microsoft a decade ago, I could say this is because the company placed too much faith in people like me. But the decline is so broad and so striking that it would be presumptuous of me to take responsibility for it.

Microsoft has become a clumsy, uncompetitive innovator. Its products are lampooned, often unfairly but sometimes with good reason. Its image has never recovered from the antitrust prosecution of the 1990s. Its marketing has been inept for years; remember the 2008 ad in which Bill Gates was somehow persuaded to literally wiggle his behind at the camera?

While Apple continues to gain market share in many products, Microsoft has lost share in Web browsers, high-end laptops and smartphones. Despite billions in investment, its Xbox line is still at best an equal contender in the game console business. It first ignored and then stumbled in personal music players until that business was locked up by Apple.

Microsoft’s huge profits — $6.7 billion for the past quarter — come almost entirely from Windows and Office programs first developed decades ago. Like G.M. with its trucks and S.U.V.’s, Microsoft can’t count on these venerable products to sustain it forever. Perhaps worst of all, Microsoft is no longer considered the cool or cutting-edge place to work. There has been a steady exit of its best and brightest.

What happened? Unlike other companies, Microsoft never developed a true system for innovation. Some of my former colleagues argue that it actually developed a system to thwart innovation. Despite having one of the largest and best corporate laboratories in the world, and the luxury of not one but three chief technology officers, the company routinely manages to frustrate the efforts of its visionary thinkers. ...

Economist's View: Why is the Left More Successful in Europe?

Economist's View: Why is the Left More Successful in Europe?

Ed Glaeser says differences in social services and the redistribution of income between Europe and the US can be explained by "America’s greater ethnic heterogeneity and more conservative political institutions":

Success of the left in Europe, the right in US, by Edward Glaeser, Commentary, Boston Globe: After spending a week in India, I was surprised to return to the news that true blue Massachusetts had acquired its first Republican senator since Edward Brooke. I should have been less shocked. . .. America remains remarkably conservative by world standards...
There are underlying factors that explain the differences between the United States and Europe. Five years ago, my colleague Alberto Alesina and I wrote a book ... which tried to understand why the United States devotes far less on social services and redistribution than nations in Western Europe. These differences can’t be explained by economic forces. Before taxes, incomes in the United States are more unequal and more volatile, which would seem to call for more, not less, redistribution. Some argue that America has less redistribution because disadvantaged Americans find it easier to climb out of poverty, but poor Americans are actually less likely than poor Europeans to move up the income ladder.
We concluded that the redistribution gap between the United States and Europe could best be explained by America’s greater ethnic heterogeneity and more conservative political institutions. Countries with more ethnic diversity generally spend less on social programs.
Before welfare reform, US states with more African-Americans were significantly less generous to their welfare recipients. My colleague Erzo Luttmer found that people in the United States who live around poor people of a different race are more likely to oppose welfare spending. There is a long historical literature, written by scholars like C. Vann Woodward, documenting the role that racial divisions have played in blunting the appeal of populist redistributors in the United States and elsewhere.
The other half of the difference between the United States and Europe can be explained by differences in political institutions. Richer countries - including the United States - that have have first-past-the-post electoral systems tend to have less redistribution. The welfare state is generally bigger in countries that make it easier for minority groups to elect leaders through proportional representation, as is the case in much of western Europe. ...
Over decades, the success of the left in Europe and the right in the United States has led to wildly different beliefs about the nature of poverty and success. We found that 60 percent of Americans thought that the poor were lazy, while only 26 percent of European share that view. Fifty four percent of Europeans think luck determines income; only 30 percent of Americans concur. These differences don’t reflect economic reality... They instead reflect the long-run ability of politics to shape public opinion. Institutions, like proportional representation, that empower the left do a good job of explaining which nations have opinions associated with the left, like the view that chance determines success.
A year ago, I wondered if the Obama victory signaled the declining significance of race and an American lurch to the left. But countries change slowly. ... By world standards, we are a conservative nation. Those who would change that fact need to dig in for a long fight.

Most of this is a rehash of things that have been covered before. What's new is the observation that the Obama victory didn't signal a lurch to the left as he thought it might.

How a New Jobless Era Will Transform America - The Atlantic (March 2010)

How a New Jobless Era Will Transform America - The Atlantic (March 2010)


OW SHOULD WEcharacterize the economic period we have now entered? After nearly two brutal years, the Great Recession appears to be over, at least technically. Yet a return to normalcy seems far off. By some measures, each recession since the 1980s has retreated more slowly than the one before it. In one sense, we never fully recovered from the last one, in 2001: the share of the civilian population with a job never returned to its previous peak before this downturn began, and incomes were stagnant throughout the decade. Still, the weakness that lingered through much of the 2000s shouldn’t be confused with the trauma of the past two years, a trauma that will remain heavy for quite some time.

The unemployment rate hit 10 percent in October, and there are good reasons to believe that by 2011, 2012, even 2014, it will have declined only a little. Late last year, the average duration of unemployment surpassed six months, the first time that has happened since 1948, when the Bureau of Labor Statistics began tracking that number. As of this writing, for every open job in the U.S., six people are actively looking for work.

All of these figures understate the magnitude of the jobs crisis. The broadest measure of unemployment and underemployment (which includes people who want to work but have stopped actively searching for a job, along with those who want full-time jobs but can find only part-time work) reached 17.4 percent in October, which appears to be the highest figure since the 1930s. And for large swaths of society—young adults, men, minorities—that figure was much higher (among teenagers, for instance, even the narrowest measure of unemployment stood at roughly 27 percent). One recent survey showed that 44 percent of families had experienced a job loss, a reduction in hours, or a pay cut in the past year.

There is unemployment, a brief and relatively routine transitional state that results from the rise and fall of companies in any economy, and there is unemployment—chronic, all-consuming. The former is a necessary lubricant in any engine of economic growth. The latter is a pestilence that slowly eats away at people, families, and, if it spreads widely enough, the fabric of society. Indeed, history suggests that it is perhaps society’s most noxious ill.

...

So what is the engine that will pull the U.S. back onto a strong growth path? That turns out to be a hard question. The New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, who fears a lost decade,said in a lecture at the London School of Economics last summer that he has “no idea” how the economy could quickly return to strong, sustainable growth. Mark Zandi, the chief economist at Moody’s Economy.com, told the Associated Press last fall, “I think the unemployment rate will be permanently higher, or at least higher for the foreseeable future. The collective psyche has changed as a result of what we’ve been through. And we’re going to be different as a result.”

One big reason that the economy stabilized last summer and fall is the stimulus; the Congressional Budget Office estimates that without the stimulus, growth would have been anywhere from 1.2 to 3.2 percentage points lower in the third quarter of 2009. The stimulus will continue to trickle into the economy for the next couple of years, but as a concentrated force, it’s largely spent. Christina Romer, the chair of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, said last fall, “By mid-2010, fiscal stimulus will likely be contributing little to further growth,” adding that she didn’t expect unemployment to fall significantly until 2011. That prediction has since been echoed, more or less, by the Federal Reserve and Goldman Sachs. ...

...

The construction and finance industries, bloated by a decade-long housing bubble, are unlikely to regain their former share of the economy, and as a result many out-of-work finance professionals and construction workers won’t be able to simply pick up where they left off when growth returns—they’ll need to retrain and find new careers. (For different reasons, the same might be said of many media professionals and auto workers.) And even within industries that are likely to bounce back smartly, temporary layoffs have generally given way to the permanent elimination of jobs, the result of workplace restructuring. Manufacturing jobs have of course been moving overseas for decades, and still are; but recently, the outsourcing of much white-collar work has become possible. Companies that have cut domestic payrolls to the bone in this recession may choose to rebuild them in Shanghai, Guangzhou, or Bangalore, accelerating off-shoring decisions that otherwise might have occurred over many years.

New jobs will come open in the U.S. But many will have different skill requirements than the old ones. “In a sense,” says Gary Burtless, a labor economist at the Brookings Institution, “every time someone’s laid off now, they need to start all over. They don’t even know what industry they’ll be in next.” And as a spell of unemployment lengthens, skills erode and behavior tends to change, leaving some people unqualified even for work they once did well. ...

...

But in fact a whole generation of young adults is likely to see its life chances permanently diminished by this recession. Lisa Kahn, an economist at Yale, has studied the impact of recessions on the lifetime earnings of young workers. In one recent study, she followed the career paths of white men who graduated from college between 1979 and 1989. She found that, all else equal, for every one-percentage-point increase in the national unemployment rate, the starting income of new graduates fell by as much as 7 percent; the unluckiest graduates of the decade, who emerged into the teeth of the 1981–82 recession, made roughly 25 percent less in their first year than graduates who stepped into boom times.

But what’s truly remarkable is the persistence of the earnings gap. Five, 10, 15 years after graduation, after untold promotions and career changes spanning booms and busts, the unlucky graduates never closed the gap. Seventeen years after graduation, those who had entered the workforce during inhospitable times were still earning 10 percent less on average than those who had emerged into a more bountiful climate. When you add up all the earnings losses over the years, Kahn says, it’s as if the lucky graduates had been given a gift of about $100,000, adjusted for inflation, immediately upon graduation—or, alternatively, as if the unlucky ones had been saddled with a debt of the same size.

When Kahn looked more closely at the unlucky graduates at mid-career, she found some surprising characteristics. They were significantly less likely to work in professional occupations or other prestigious spheres. And they clung more tightly to their jobs: average job tenure was unusually long. People who entered the workforce during the recession “didn’t switch jobs as much, and particularly for young workers, that’s how you increase wages,” Kahn told me. This behavior may have resulted from a lingering risk aversion, born of a tough start. But a lack of opportunities may have played a larger role, she said: when you’re forced to start work in a particularly low-level job or unsexy career, it’s easy for other employers to dismiss you as having low potential. Moving up, or moving on to something different and better, becomes more difficult. ...

...

A large and long-standing body of research shows that physical health tends to deteriorate during unemployment, most likely through a combination of fewer financial resources and a higher stress level. The most-recent research suggests that poor health is prevalent among the young, and endures for a lifetime. Till Von Wachter, an economist at Columbia University, and Daniel Sullivan, of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, recently looked at the mortality rates of men who had lost their jobs in Pennsylvania in the 1970s and ’80s. They found that particularly among men in their 40s or 50s, mortality rates rose markedly soon after a layoff. But regardless of age, all men were left with an elevated risk of dying in each year following their episode of unemployment, for the rest of their lives. And so, the younger the worker, the more pronounced the effect on his lifespan: the lives of workers who had lost their job at 30, Von Wachter and Sullivan found, were shorter than those who had lost their job at 50 or 55—and more than a year and a half shorter than those who’d never lost their job at all.

...


Cellphone and Entertainment Fees Add Up for Families - NYTimes.com

Cellphone and Entertainment Fees Add Up for Families - NYTimes.com

John Anderson and Sharon Rapoport estimate they spend $400 a month, or close to $5,000 a year, keeping their family of four entertained at home.

There are the $30-a-month data plans on their BlackBerry Tour cellphones. The Roanoke, Va., couple’s teenage sons, Seth and Isaac, each have $50 subscriptions for Xbox Live and send thousands of texts each month on their cellphones, requiring their own data plans.
...

It used to be that a basic $25-a-month phone bill was your main telecommunications expense. But by 2004, the average American spent $770.95 annually on services like cable television, Internet connectivity and video games, according to data from the Census Bureau. By 2008, that number rose to $903, outstripping inflation. By the end of this year, it is expected to have grown to $997.07. Add another $1,000 or more for cellphone service and the average family is spending as much on entertainment over devices as they are on dining out or buying gasoline.

And those government figures do not take into account movies, music and television shows bought through iTunes, or the data plans that are increasingly mandatory for more sophisticated smartphones.

...

Consumers will have to make tough choices like Ms. Goodall and her husband as the next generation of connected devices — TVs and various mobile devices — that have their own data plan or subscription service come to market. The cable TV companies battle the phone companies by bundling cable, landline phone and Internet services, but most wireless carriers do not yet have any programs to bundle the data plans and offer discounts for myriad mobile devices. ....

Friday, February 12, 2010

“Guard Labor” and Our Capitalist Economy � Open Economics

“Guard Labor” and Our Capitalist Economy � Open Economics

The term guard labor, for me, calls to mind situations in developing countries in which the wealthy feel the need for multiple armed guards around their estate to keep out possible intruders. The mansions sit on the hill, likely looking out over a valley of slums, paintintg a portrait of a highly unequal society. However, this situation need not be limited to the third world- US inequalities are great enough such that the US employs guard labor strikingly. Mark Thoma to a piecediscussing the economist Samuel Bowles, who has done work on inequality and its relationship with guard labor.

“Prior to about 20 years ago, most economists thought that inequality just greased the wheels of progress. Overwhelmingly now, people who study it empirically think that it’s sand in the wheels.” … Bowles offers a key reason why this is so. “Inequality breeds conflict, and conflict breeds wasted resources,” he says…

Inequality leads to an excess of what Bowles calls “guard labor.” [...] Roughly 1 in 4 Americans is employed to keep fellow citizens in line and protect private wealth from would-be Robin Hoods.

There is also a clear relationship across states between the state’s gini coefficient and it’s proportion of guard labor. There is thus a clear mechanism by which inequality is not just unfair but inefficient:

The problem, Bowles argues, is that too much guard labor sustains “illegitimate inequalities,” creating a drag on the economy. All of the people in guard labor jobs could be doing something more productive with their time—perhaps starting their own businesses.

Thoma writes,

With progressive taxes the lucky do pay a little extra, and that allows society to provide social insurance to the unlucky…if the guard labor hypothesis is correct, it provides yet another rationale for a progressive tax code.

My question is: is a progressive tax code enough to address this societal ill? Redistribution programs are great when they work, but the political space for them is limited. Perhaps our economic structure has endemic fissures like these; in that case, studies like this one call for a deeper look at our society’s basic mechanisms of distributing wealth, rather than retooling around the margins.

Long Term Unemployed

Worthwhile2

Worthwhile2

The US Economic Crisis: Jobs Continue to Vanish While the Media Applauds “Recovery”

The US Economic Crisis: Jobs Continue to Vanish While the Media Applauds “Recovery”

At first glance it appeared there was a typo in the headlines. The national media reported that, in January, another 20,000 more jobs were lost. Somehow, the unemployment rate dropped, from 10 percent to 9.7 percent. Nobody thought this paradox was worth explaining; instead, the media’s attitude was “more good news” about the economy.

But there was other evidence of an obliterated job market hiding behind the cheerful headlines. After revising the employment numbers in 2009, The New York Times reported, “…the economy lost 150,000 jobs in December, far more than the 85,000 initially reported.” Overall in 2009, the adjusted numbers showed an additional “…1.36 million fewer jobs…” (February 5, 2010).

And yet the unemployment rate dropped. One reason this happened is that the U.S. government uses a separate, more unreliable survey to calculate the unemployment rate, in contrast to the survey used to calculate job losses. There are other more important ways the government obscures the unemployment numbers: if you are no longer receiving unemployment benefits you’re not counted as unemployed; if you’ve given up looking for a job, you’re not counted either. You are counted, however, if you are working only 15 hours a week, or if you're a temporary worker.

In this way the government cooks the books to bring fake optimism to the masses. The mainstream mediareports these fraudulent numbers without asking questions, so that the Democrats can continue doing absolutely nothing towards creating jobs.

But there is a method to the madness. Mass unemployment brings incredible pressure on workers’ wages and benefits. The mere threat of being unemployed puts unorganized workers in a precarious position when they’re told to work for less.

The organized labor movement is suffering from the recession too. In 2009 the number of workers belonging to unions fell by 771,000. Since union workers have higher standards of living, this number implies a further drop in wages and benefits overall.

These depressing numbers are cheered by corporations and politicians alike. To them, “economic recovery” means corporate recovery — an increase in profits, nothing more. And lower wages mean that profits are going to be even higher.

The shallow recovery that politicians are boasting about has been limited to some big businesses, especially Wall Street. Obama rejoiced at the recent news of 5.7 percent increase in GDP, even though this increase came at the expense of hundreds of thousands of jobs. The New York Times also added insight to how corporations are boosting profits:

“Instead of adding workers, many companies are squeezing their existing work forces to produce more. Productivity rose by a seasonally adjusted 6.2 percent in the fourth quarter…” (February 5, 2010).

To summarize: jobs continue to be cut by the thousands, while the remaining workers are forced to work harder with the same or often lower wages and benefits. This is the “new economy” that politicians speak of when they discuss “increasing exports” on the world market, a plan that requires that U.S. workers make lower wages to compete with the slave-wages overseas.

This is why the Democrats are doing nothing of substance to create living wage jobs. They tell lies about the job market recovering, creating false hopes by announcing skewed employment numbers to the public.

Such illusions can have only a temporary pacifying effect. Resentment is building up and optimistic speeches are wearing thin. But action is needed. Workers and the unemployed must unite to demand the creation of living wage jobs — a real jobs program that rebuilds America’s infrastructure and promotes education and social services. A good first step would be for union members to demand that all unions, from the very top to the bottom, organize the unorganized, and fight for the jobless by building a massive spring demonstration inWashington, DC, and on the West Coast for a massive jobs program. ...

Comparative Advantage

Comparative Advantage

The Perils and Pitfalls of the Theory of Comparative Advantage:
Some Economic Myths that Everybody Should be Aware of

At the time Ricardo wrote he was right that England had a comparative advantage in making cloth and Portugal in making wine. But this was not the result of economics, much less did it prove the superiority of free trade (Magdoff 1978, chapter 5). History reveals that the comparative advantages of England and Portugal had their origin not so much in economics as in politics. “The comparative advantage that mattered was rooted not in soil or labor productivity, but in the superiority of British sea power and in Portugal’s inability to hold on to its overseas empire without the protection of the British navy” (Magdoff 1978, p.156). Indeed, once the incipient capitalist nations found it more profitable to restrict industrial development to their own part of the world and consolidated their monopolistic position, this could not be given up without seriously disturbing the whole fabric of Western capitalism. To preserve the nonindustrial nations as markets for their manufacturing industries, the developed nations had to develop a commercial policy, and enforce it. It was argued that nature itself destined some countries to to be producers of primary products. More than a "natural" fact, this division was also an economic convenience, as summarized in the theory of comparative costs (i.e., countries should produce what they are better at). This way, the argument continued, everyone would be better off and everyone would gain by this international division of labor into industrial and non-industrial nations. As we know, however, the exchange between these two groups of countries has favored the developed ones and been disadvantageous to the underdeveloped ones. It has proven a dauting task for most developing countries to capitalze production in competition with the already highly monopoplized capital of the developed world. In reality, the widening productivity gap between the capitalistically developed and underdeveloped regions is a well-documented fact.

Magdoff describes in detail the economic and political relationships between England and Portugal, going back to the fourteenth century. The fate of the two countries was sealed in a series of treaties between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where England, in exchange for its military help to Portugal to maintain its colonies, imposed the conditions which enforced an international division of labor, “celebrated up to this day as a prime example of the virtues of objective and independent economic laws” (Magdoff 1978, p.156). These treaties fostered Portugal’s economic dependence on England by opening the door English ships in Portugal and in Portugal’s African and Indian territories. Moreover, they gave special privileges to English traders in Portugal, and required that Portugal buy all its ships from England.

...

This brief historical tour indicates that there is much more about the development of the theory of comparative advantage than standard textbooks tell. More important perhaps than the Ricardian example of trade between England and Portugal in historical perspective is the relation between England and Asia. In fact, Portugal –and to a lesser extent Spain- Holland and England, had successfully dominated the trade routes to the East. As noted recently by Pomeranz (2000), until around 1800 the living standards in the West, including England, were not very different from those in the East, particularly in PRC. In fact, if anything, trade with Asia – starting with the trade and silk routes dominated by Arab, Venetian and Genoese merchants and up to the nineteen century – was the result of Western demand for the more developed and sophisticated Eastern goods (e.g., silk, cotton textiles, species, porcelain, rugs, etc.). Further, Pomeranz (2000) shows that several measures of well-being demonstrate that the PRC was ahead of Europe. Grain and sugar consumption was higher as well as caloric intake. Furthermore, wages were in general higher, and in particular, Chinese textile workers received higher wages. More importantly, life expectancy measures show that PCR was not lagging behind. This is the inescapable conclusion one must derive from Maddison`s (2000, pp. 29-41) data too.

...

The new emphasis on the similarities between Western Europe and the PRC up to the late eighteen early nineteen-century is certainly important. However, the emphasis on similarities should not obscure the big difference associated with Western European dominance of long distance trade. The dominance in long distance trade reflects, despite revisionists’ claims, a more advanced naval technology, and more importantly, more developed weaponry (Landes, 1998). Not only did Western Europe dominate the trade routes that connected it with Asia, but also Portuguese, Dutch and British ships dominated a good part of intra-Asian trade. Between the great discoveries and the Industrial Revolution, the European share in total world trade increased – in particular because intra-Asian trade and intra-American trade was dominated by Europeans– while that of Asia decreased drastically. However, if Asia was not lagging behind technologically and its living standards were close to those on the West, how did they lose their trade position? According to Krugman’s story the trade position had to be a reflex of the technological situation.

The analysis above leads us to conclude that comparative advantage was “historically created” as the result of colonialism, wars, nationalist rivalries and military power. And, as Magdoff points out, “this is but a mild example of the origins of the international division of labor: it occurred, after all, between two Christian, colonizing powers” (Magdoff 1978, p.159). And according to Cohen: “In order to fully grasp the nature of this drama, let us examine the Southern part of Ricardo’s program” (Cohen 1998, p.35; italics added). When England started specializing in manufactures and industrial production, it had to find countries that were willing to import. Portugal was one of them, but it was very small. Other markets were needed. The other large and powerful countries of Europe were trying to catch up with Britain and were also developing their industrial base. “In practice, trade could occur only with countries that were under British rule. When India was flooded with British products, the result of was total destruction of its industrial base” (Cohen 1998, p.36). In the early nineteenth century, India was a net exporter of textiles and its cottage industry was well developed. However, by the end of the century, three-fourths of the textiles consumed in India were imported from England. “But the tragedy did not stop here” (Cohen 1998, p.36). India produced wheat and other food crops. However, England preferred to import these from the United States, with the consequence that it left India with exports of cotton, jute and indigo. This meant that India was forced to specialize in the cultivation of products that did not guarantee its own food supply. India saw itself having famines, importing basic products, and each time the world’s state of affairs was unfavorable, not affording to import food. Magdoff, quoting historian Carlo Cippola, summarizes all this state of affairs brilliantly:

...

While reading standard textbooks one is implicitly led to believe that Ricardo wrote pages and pages about his theory of comparative advantage, and that this was a central theme in his writings. Neither is true. Ricardo was concerned with the dynamic process of capital accumulation and he analyzed this issue in the context of economic classes. The key questions in his writings were: how is surplus extracted?, who gets it?, and what is it used for? (i.e., questions about distribution). Ricardo lived between the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. At this time, England was not self-sufficient in food production, and Ricardo saw capitalists’ profits being reduced by the rising costs of corn (generic for grain, mostly wheat, production). This situation benefited the landlords, who would spend their rents on luxury consumption. Ricardo argued that the key to growth lay in the greatest possible accumulation of capital. This would induce the demand for labor to rise, leading to a tendency for the wage rate of the working classes to be above the subsistence level. This would increase consumption. But this depended, of course, on food being cheap, corn freely imported, and rents low so that the landlords would be unable to suck up most of the surplus for luxury consumption. The policy that Ricardo proposed for unbinding the British economy from the trap of land resource constraint was liberalization of grain imports, or more specifically, the repeal of the Corn Laws that had imposed a tariff barrier on the import of cheap grain from abroad as part of the mercantile system. Ricardo argued that superior lands should be available in infinite amounts not within Britain, but tin the world including new continents. The repeal of the Corn Laws was a necessary condition to sustain modern economic growth that began with the Industrial Revolution. As such, Ricardo provided to the emerging bourgeois class a theoretical edge to fight the vested interests of landed aristocracy and gentry.

This is the historical context in which Ricardo included no more than a couple of pages on comparative advantage. Ricardo saw the incipient capitalist mode of production as the most advantageous for the creation of wealth, and thus saw the importance of capitalists in this process. Ricardo was ruthless toward the English aristocracy because they were siphoning the surplus due to the high prices of corn. The solution was to import corn. When Ricardo set out the case against protection, he was supporting British economic interests. ...

Paul Abrams: Limbaugh Lauds (Socialist) Medical Care in Hawaii

Paul Abrams: Limbaugh Lauds (Socialist) Medical Care in Hawaii

"but I think the most likely reason of all was the Grinch had a heart two sizes too small" ("How the Grinch Stole Christmas," Dr. Seuss).

According to Rush Limbaugh, the health care reform that may be passed by Congress is socialism. Yet, it bears a striking resemblance to the universal healthcare system that just treated him in Hawaii that prompted his remark: "there is nothing wrong with the American health care system. I received no special treatment."

Yes, Rush. That's the point! American medicine is superb--for those who can get it. And, in Hawaii, no one gets special treatment, because everyone can get it.

[Er, by the way, just to help you out, Rush, a fair percentage of your listeners do not know Hawaii is part of the United States, so clarify that for them...otherwise, they will wonder about you]

By accepting socialist medical treatment in Hawaii, therefore, Rush Limbaugh has shown that, when one is ill, what matters is the availability of quality health care, even if it is socialist.

Rush follows a long litany of conservatives, such as all Members of Congress that have a medical office paid for by taxpayers available in the Capitol, by Dick Cheney who had socialist pacemakers implanted paid for by the government, and George W who had a government-paid socialist colonoscopy while in office. Members of Congress over 65 get single-payer socialist medical care from Medicare. ...

Rogue Nation: How Does the U.S. Deal With China? | OurFuture.org

Rogue Nation: How Does the U.S. Deal With China? | OurFuture.org

China has surpassed Germany as the world's largest exporter. It is the largest holder of American Treasury bonds, nearly $800 billion. America runs its largest trade deficit by far with China. The low-price flood of goods—the Wal-Mart trade—is pervasive. Now the U.S. even runs a growing deficit in advanced technology products.

China flouts the rules and the spirit of the "free trade" global economic order that the U.S. constructed and, under former president Bill Clinton, invited China to join, granting both permanent normal trading relations and membership in the World Trade Organization.

China is a mercantilist nation, largely copying the successful Asian model developed by the Japanese and the Asian tigers. Its communist dictators plan and guide an economy geared to develop through exports. The elements of its model are clear, evident to all who would see, and not often admitted. They include:

  • An artificially undervalued currency, pegged to the dollar;
  • An industrial policy that targets "pillar industries," using a broad range of subsidies and protections to capture of world markets;
  • A complicated maze of trade barriers that allows systematic pressure on foreign multinationals to invest for export in China and to transfer their most advanced production techniques to China;
  • Systematic efforts to pirate technology, trade secrets and copyrighted materials;
  • A system of forced savings that funds investment.

In the global economy, China is a rogue nation—with success that breeds envy and imitation. Its system works very well for China, but not for the rest of the world, as respected commentators like Martin Wolf of the Financial Times have pointed out. As the IMF warned, the dramatic trade imbalances run by China as a mercantilist nation and the U.S. as the consumer of last resort are destabilizing and unsustainable—and contributed directly to the financial bubble and bust that drove the world into the Great Recession.

...

That strategy includes export controls, procurement policy, and "a strategic approach to climate and energy."

China has made new energy a "pillar industry." It has deployed the entire range of its mercantilist strategies to make itself the leading manufacturing of solar panels.

If capturing a leading edge of these industries is vital to our nation's economic security, then shouldn't we get serious about an industrial policy that goes far beyond the Pentagon?

Thursday, February 11, 2010

Moving On Up and Hitting a Wall: Social Mobility in the U.S. and Europe | CommonDreams.org

Moving On Up and Hitting a Wall: Social Mobility in the U.S. and Europe | CommonDreams.org
by Michelle Chen

America: land of opportunity... if you're lucky enough to be born into one. The crumbling of the American Dream is in plain view across the country, especially in the urban centers and desolate ghost towns that have long been hollowed of their economic promise. A new comparative study shows just how far America's mythology has slipped on a global scale.

According a report on social mobility published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], the United States ranks pretty poorly among industrialized nations on intergenerational advancement--that is, the ability to transcend the socioeconomic class, income level, and educational attainment of your family. So that whole bootstraps thing? It looks like that quintessential self-made man is more at home in Norway than Our Town.

In patterns of socioeconomic gains across generations, the United States ranked on par with France, Italy and the United Kingdom on some measures. Some trends were generally constant throughout the countries studied, such as the correlation between educational attainment and fathers' and sons' wages. And some socioeconomic barriers that are uniquely, and shamefully, American:

Mobility in earnings across pairs of fathers and sons is particularly low in France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, while mobility is higher in the Nordic countries, Australia and Canada....

The influence of parental socio-economic status on students' achievement in secondary education is particularly strong in Belgium, France and the United States, while it is weaker in some Nordic countries, as well as in Canada and Korea. Moreover, in many OECD countries, including all the large continental European ones, students' achievement is strongly influenced by their school environment....

in the United Kingdom, Italy, the United States and France... at least 40% of the economic advantage that high-earnings fathers have over low-earnings fathers is transmitted to their sons.

The findings expose the entrenchment of a class hierarchy even in supposedly modern, diverse democracies. It seems inheritance is still a major driver of opportunity, even in the land of the free. America does stand out among our more regressive European brethren, however, in that we utterly lack the social safety nets that have served as a buffer against structural inequality. While class divisions in France or England may be frustrating in terms of individual opportunity, lower-class status for the French and British is far less likely to result in a family death sentence due to lack of health care.

Perhaps because of the countries studied vary widely in their demographic mix, the study does not explore in detail how race and ethnicity track socioeconomic status and by extension, intergenerational mobility. As a singularly American institution, institutional racism intersects with and sometimes trumps class divides. A 2009 Pew study on economic mobility found links between racial and economic segregation that dictate the fate of whole generations of Black children. Over time, their individual prospects were directly tied to the advancement, or regression, of their communities:

• Four in five black children who started in the top three quintiles experienced downward mobility, compared with just two in five white children. Three in five white children who started in the bottom two quintiles experienced upward mobility, versus just one in four black children.

• If black and white children had grown up in neighborhoods with similar poverty rates (i.e., if whites had grown up where blacks did or blacks had grown up where whites did), the gap in downward mobility between them would be smaller by one-fourth to one-third.

• Neighborhood poverty alone accounts for a greater portion of the black-white downward mobility gap than the effects of parental education, occupation, labor force participation, and a range of other family characteristics combined.

But the OECD study parses the impact of social policy in shaping, or reversing, some of the legacy of inequality. Mobility can be promoted through investing quality schools and early childhood education, encouraging socioeconomic integration, progressive welfare policies that even out wealth inequality, and financial aid to broaden higher education opportunities for students of disadvantaged backgrounds. But redistribution of material resources can only go so far in a society where opportunity often hangs on the color line--as race can't be erased through education or tax policy. And in a democratic society, racial identity and community ties should be allowed to continue across generations, even as poverty and hardship are overcome.

The American myth of opportunity isn't necessarily obsolete, but in the face of systemic discrimination, pursuing the Dream means waking up from delusions of colorblindness.

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

Corporate Welfare Roulette | CommonDreams.org

Corporate Welfare Roulette | CommonDreams.org
by Jim Hightower

One thing that governors and mayors absolutely love to do is win a prize in the national game called "Corporate Welfare Roulette." It's a simple casino-style game in which politicos put down a big stack of taxpayers' money on an out-of-state corporation as an "incentive," hoping that their bet outbids other states and cities trying to lure that same corporation to move to their area and hire some people.

There's always a celebration when politicos "win" one of these cash-for-jobs gambles. The media gather, politicos prance, the Chamber of Commerce chief grins from ear to ear and the corporate CEO mouths platitudes about free enterprise (while stuffing taxpayer cash in his pockets).

Only six years ago, Winston-Salem, N.C., had its lucky day, having won the spin of the roulette wheel to land a corporate gem. Dell, the computer giant, was headed to town, pledging to erect a state-of-the-art assembly plant and hire up to 1,500 folks.

"We won," crowed all the local poobahs. They had put down about $318 million in tax giveaways, cash and other freebies to land the prize, and in October 2005, they enjoyed the glorious grand opening of Dell's $7 million plant. The future was bright.

However, one thing that governors and mayors absolutely hate to do is to face up to the fact that their prize has reneged, failing to deliver the promised number of jobs. Real bad politics.

Last October, four years and two days after Dell's gala opening in Winston-Salem, the giant suddenly upped and left! It abruptly announced that it would soon cut out for the cheap-labor havens of Asia, shut down the still-sparkling assembly plant, discard the 900 people it had hired (600 short of its promise) and kiss off North Carolina. Thanks for the memories. Adios, chumps.

Formerly gleeful politicos were now howling, demanding "every red cent of incentive money" back. But they had put down their money and taken their chances, and corporate gods are notoriously fickle.

While much of North Carolina's subsidy had not yet been doled out, taxpayers still took a hit of about $17 million for its fling with Dell. Meanwhile, the roulette wheel continues to spin, and more and more taxpayers across the country are learning that they're getting stiffed, receiving only a fraction of the jobs they were taxed to bring to their area. ...